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This chapter relates current transformations in higher education in European 
economies to current transformations of the public sector in general, and 
changes in higher education to changes in other public services provided 
within traditional European welfare states. In particular, it links ongoing 
discussions about the future of the welfare state under the pressures of 
globalisation and changing demographics to discussions about the future 
of public investment in higher education and to the wider question of the 
production and reproduction of the university. It discusses the position that 
the World Bank is taking with respect to the state, public sector reforms 
and higher education reforms, both in general and for transition economies, 
and highlights the contrast between its publications on the future of the 
welfare state and the future of public higher education. The World Bank has 
been particularly involved in both the conceptualisation and implementation 
of reforms of major public services, especially but not only in developing 
and transition countries: the reforms of education, healthcare, and pensions. 
Further, the chapter discusses the state's changing fiscal conditions and 
major competitors to higher education among welfare (and other) services, 
especially in the European transition countries. It links the question of the 
reformulation of the pact between the nation-state and the modern university 
to the issue of the renegotiation of the post-war welfare contract in general. 
The chapter finds it useful to view higher education in the context of changing 
welfare state policies as higher education is a significant part of the public 
sector and welfare state services, in general, have been under severe pressures, 
both on the theoretical and practical levels. Finally, tentative conclusions are 
given. 
The welfare state, globalisation, and public investment in 
higher education 
Social scientists have divergent views about the causes of the current pressures 
on the traditional Keynesian post-war European models of the welfare state 
(both the Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and Southern European, 
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although to different degrees and with different intensity). They seem to 
agree on a single point though: we are facing the radical reformulation of the 
welfare state as we know it in most industrialised nations in Europe) There 
does not seem to be a major disagreement, broadly speaking, about the future 
of the welfare state in its current European post-war forms: its foundations, for 
a variety of internal and external reasons and due to a variety of international 
and domestic pressures, need to be renegotiated today (see Kwiek 2007b). 
The idea of the welfare state will probably continue, albeit in modified, 
adapted forms. Major differences between social scientists researching the 
area of welfare state are based on different explanations about what has been 
happening to the European welfare state regimes since the mid-1970s until 
now, about different variations and paths of restructuring in different European 
countries, and different degrees of emphasis concerning the scope of welfare 
state downsizing in particular European countries in the future. The impact 
of globalisation on the welfare state is an issue that sharply divides researchers 
on welfare issues (see Genschel 2004: 632, or Kwiek on globalists, skeptics, 
and moderates, 2006a: 169-214). The question debated today is not whether 
recasting the European welfare state has come to be seen as necessary by the 
national governments of most affluent Western democracies, international 
organisations (such as the OECD), global organisations and development 
agencies (such as the World Bank) and the European Commission; it is rather 
why it is seen as necessary, and here the answers include economic integration 
and/or demographic changes, changes in societal norms etc. As Maurizio 
Ferrera explained the fundamental logic that is guiding policy solutions to 
the reform processes of the welfare state today: `system-wide searches for 
novel, economically viable, socially acceptable and politically feasible policy 
solutions are underway' (Ferrera 2003: 596).2 
Under these new circumstances, the prospects for the future in those 
countries with largely publicly funded higher education seem to be that 
higher education will be increasingly seen as just one part of public services 
as it already is seen in many countries), with its traditional uniqueness 
removed, with many consequences. The public sector, especially in transition 
countries, is often viewed as ineffective and unaccountable, in need of being 
restructured. One way to break away from this perspective is to view higher 
education as a social investment, rather than a social burden, crucial for the 
development of `knowledge-based' societies and economies, or to view higher 
education through the lens of social capital formation. Martin Carnoy sounds 
moderately optimistic when he concludes in his book about globalisation and 
educational reforms that: 
Because knowledge is the most highly valued commodity in the global 
economy, nations have little choice but to increase their investment in 
education. 
(Carnoy 1999: 82) 
34 Marek Kwiek 
The question is which level of education Carnoy means above; it is 
interesting to note Gøsta Esping-Andersen's arguments against increasing 
public investments in higher education for knowledge-based societies (as 
opposed to massive public investments in early schooling and families with 
children).3 In his view, a knowledge-intensive economy will lead to a new 
social polarisation. The long-term scenario might very well be `a smattering 
of "knowledge islands" in a great sea of marginalized outsiders'. To avoid this 
bleak development, cognitive capacities and the resource base of citizens must 
be strengthened. On numerous occasions, he recommends increased public 
investment in families with children, rather than in higher education (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen 2002: 3; 2001: 134-5). This argument, if taken seriously 
by national governments, could be used against free („ tax-based") higher 
education in major parts of Europe — especially together with the argument 
that higher education is increasingly a private and individual (rather than 
public and collective) good. Interestingly, the European Commission, perhaps 
for the first time, has emphasised recently that free access to higher education 
'does not necessarily guarantee social equity. Member States should therefore 
critically examine their current mix of student fees and support schemes in 
the light of their actual efficiency and equity' (EC 2006: 7; see also Kwiek 
2004a. 2004b 1. 
The claim shared by many economists, sociologists and welfare analysts is 
that the limits of public expenditure and taxation have probably already been 
reached in the EU member countries. Investment for the knowledge society 
is already subject to strong external constraints. Esping-Andersen rightly 
mentions `new winners and losers' and a deepening gulf between those with 
and without skills.4 He suggests two ground rules for policy making: one, `we 
cannot pursue too one-dimensionally a "learning society", a human 
capital-based strategy in the belief that a tide of education will lift all boats. Such 
a strategy inevitably leaves the less-endowed behind'; and two, `new social 
policy challenges cannot be met by any additional taxation or spending as 
a per cent of GDP. We must accordingly concentrate on how to improve 
the status quo' (Esping-Andersen 2001: 146-7). So the same (or sometimes 
smaller in transition economies) pie may have to be divided up differently. 
Between 1995 and 2002, the growth in public expenditure per student 
in most EU countries was still the same or higher than the growth in the 
number of students, Sweden being the only exception; the opposite trend was 
observed in new EU entrants in most of which growth in numbers was not 
accompanied by growth in per student funding; see OECD (2006: 175). 
It looks like the whole traditional post-war slice-cutting of the pie of state 
funding may have to be renegotiated. Former winners may be future losers 
(and vice versa) under changing priorities, growing inequalities and possibly 
new ideas regarding what counts most in our societies and what counts less. 
Even though the outcome of these changing priorities is uncertain, so far public 
higher education has not competed successfully with two major welfare areas, 
pensions and healthcare (there are indications of a new theoretical context, 
though, in which there is a possibility of a `re-calibration of social insurance 
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from "old-age protection" to "societal integration" and "human capital 
upgrading"', Ferrera 2003: 592, which might lead to new ideas favouring 
higher education more than today). The effects of changing priorities may 
be different in different countries; in the EU transition economies, though, 
this may mean the introduction of cost-sharing elements in public higher 
education, following the UK example. One can expect these to include a 
mixture of student fees, loans, and grants. 
Thus although it is possible to claim substantial increases in the share in the 
GDP of the public funds for national public higher education systems using 
the `knowledge-based society' and `human capital upgrading' argumentation, 
in practice it has not worked in any of the major OECD countries or European 
transition countries so far (as opposed to public per student expenditure, 
public expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP in 
2002 was smaller than the total public and private expenditure in 1995 in 
the vast majority of OECD countries, including the UK, Norway, Australia, 
France, Portugal, the USA, Finland, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands; 
the few exceptions include Denmark, Poland, Greece and Turkey; see OECD 
2006: 180). The situation of financing higher education better recalls that of 
raising taxes for the sake of raising the standards of welfare provisions: even 
though transition countries would like to have better public universities, their 
citizens do not seem willing to pay higher taxes for this reason (compare the 
generally supportive attitude towards welfare opposed to the unwillingness to 
be taxed accordingly, and the number of transition countries in which flat tax 
was introduced; additionally, OECD countries are experiencing a shrinking 
tax base: as Pierre Pestieau put it recently, `the share of regular, steady salaried 
labor is declining in a large number of countries, and thus the share of payroll 
tax base in the GDP is shrinking', Pestieau 2006: 35). 
The option of more public funding for higher education (or research 
and development) in Europe in the future is explicitly excluded even by the 
European Commission which suggests substantially more private funding, 
both for teaching (through fees) and research (from private companies).' 
In general terms, ongoing (and envisaged for the future) reformulations of 
the welfare state in European economies, no matter whether related only 
to globalisation and economic integration, or only to domestic national 
factors connected, for example, to demographic changes, or finally related to 
both, at the moment do not provide promising ground for policies treating 
higher education as public investment. This may have fundamental effects 
on both students and academics: fee-paying students can increasingly view 
themselves as customers of services provided by academics and as clients of 
university services (as is the case in the booming private sector of higher 
education in several transition countries, Poland included), there may be 
more managerialism and stronger business orientation of academic units 
less reliant on core state public subsidies, more market ideology and sets of 
practices drawn from the world of business, more reliance on market forces 
and non-core non-state `earned' income, and the intensification of work of the 
increasingly contracted academic staff etc. Higher education is increasingly 
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viewed as a public cost/burden and a private good. But — as commentators 
stress — welfare transfers still, under strong globalisation-related pressures, 
remain a political choice (Gizelis 2005: 159) and the role of electorates in 
democratic systems is fundamental in determining the depth and character of 
welfare state restructuring (Swank 2001: 198). 
Globalisation and the public sector: the World Bank 
story revisited 
Thus the debate on the future of (public) higher education today comes as part 
and parcel of a much wider, and often ideological, debate on the future of the 
public sector in general (and state intervention in, or provision of, different, 
traditionally public, services; on pension reforms globally, see Schwarz et al. 
1999, on pension reforms in Europe, see Holzmann 2004, Holzmann et al. 
2003, and Holzmann and Palacios 2001; on healthcare reforms in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), see Adeyi et al. 1997, Kornai et al. 2001, and on 
CEE and globalisation, see Orenstein et al. 2002). Certainly in the period of 
the traditional Keynesian post-war welfare state regimes in Europe it was the 
state — rather than the market — that was deeply involved in the economy and 
in the protection of nation-state citizens against the potential social evils of 
post-war capitalism. As the World Bank's flagship publication on the role of 
the state ( The State in a Changing World) argued, for much of the twentieth 
century people looked to government or the state to do more; but since the 
1980s, the pendulum has been swinging again, and the existing conceptions 
of the state's place in the world have been challenged by such developments 
as, for example, the collapse of command-and-control economies or the 
fiscal crisis of the welfare state. Consequently, today, politicians are asking 
again what government's role ought to be and how its roles should be played 
(World Bank 1997: 17). 
It was in CEE, exposed to the influences of global agencies in redefining 
their national welfare policies following the collapse of communism in 
1989, that the direct link between the new `effective' state on the one hand 
(with a downsizing of the public sector and a redefined minimal welfare 
state) and higher education policies on the other, was very much visible. 
With almost no exceptions, higher education in the 1990s was the lowest 
priority in transition countries, with chronic underfunding as a permanent 
feature. Still another paradox, largely overlooked, was that the policies for 
the ten accession countries which joined the EU in 2004, generally promoted 
and praised in subsequent accession countries' reports by the European 
Commission, were not exactly `European' policies rooted in European 
models of the welfare state with its generally accepted `European social 
model'. On the contrary, as Zsuzsa Ferge convincingly demonstrates (and as 
many of us Central Europeans know very well from policies actually being 
implemented in the healthcare, pensions, higher education and other public 
sectors), these policies are largely neoliberal.6 That is another reason to take 
the link between the reformulations of the welfare state and emergent higher 
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education policies seriously in Central and Eastern Europe; it is here that 
educational policies, and consequently the future of public universities, may 
be going hand in hand with changing welfare policies, as in the traditional 
World Bank formulation of the `third wave of privatisation' where changes 
in (higher) education follow changes in the two major claimants on welfare 
state resources: healthcare services and public pensions systems (see Rama 
2000; Torres and Mathur 1996; Kritzer 2002, 2005). 
To refer to an image used by numerous commentators — that of a state/ 
market pendulum (see Evans 1997: 83): the pendulum had swung from 
the statist development model to the `minimalist state' model of the 1980s. 
The countries involved in implementing `reinventing government' policies 
had squeezed programmes in education and health but the result of this 
'overzealous rejection of government' was, the World Bank admits, the 
'neglect of the state's vital functions, threatening social welfare and eroding 
the foundations for market development' (World Bank 1997: 24). So, after 
a few years, probably for the first time in the World Development Report of 
1997 referred to here, the World Bank, heavily involved in implementing 
structural adjustment policies in developing countries, had to admit that the 
idea of the `minimal state' did not work. It is here that a crucial passage 
which shows a considerable change in the Bank's attitude to the state appears: 
'Development — economic, social, and sustainable — without an effective 
state is impossible. It is increasingly recognized that an effective state — not a 
minimal one — is central to economic and social development' (World Bank 
1997: 25). 
The state is thus viewed by the World Bank not as a direct provider of 
growth but a `partner, catalyst, and facilitator', not as a sole provider but a 
'facilitator and regulator', not as a `director' but a `partner and facilitator' 
World Bank 1997: 1, 2, 18). The state should certainly be assisting house-
holds to cope with certain risks to their economic security but `the idea 
that the state alone must carry this burden is changing'.' Coming back to 
the picture of the state/market pendulum, citizens (especially from the 
developing world) should not look for solutions provided by the state — but 
should focus instead on solutions provided by the market. The consequences 
for the public sector, including higher education, are far-reaching: `although 
the state still has a central role in ensuring the provision of basic services — 
education, health, infrastructure — it is not obvious that the state must be the 
only provider, or a provider at all' (World Bank 1997: 27). An `effective state' 
can leave some areas to the market and the areas where markets and private 
spending can meet most needs are `urban hospitals, clinics, universities, and 
transport' (World Bank 1997: 53). 
New publications on the tertiary education sector in the World Bank 
carry different overtones, though. Constructing Knowledge Societies: New 
Challenges for Tertiary Education (2002) was very careful in describing a 
state's obligations with respect to higher education: obligations include 
working within a coherent policy framework, providing an enabling regulatory 
environment, and working towards financial incentives; the state's role is 
38 Marek Kwiek 
guidance rather than steering, and in the elaboration of a clear vision for the 
long-term development of the education system on a national level (World 
Bank 2002: xxii—xxiv). Despite diminished fiscal resources and competing 
claims from other sectors, governments in the World Bank's account still 
have at least three strong reasons for supporting the higher educational 
sector: investments in higher education generate external benefits essential 
for economic and social development; capital market imperfections make 
loans largely unavailable to students on a large scale, in a wide range of 
programmes; and finally, higher education plays a key role in supporting basic 
and secondary education (World Bank 2002: 76). The report does not leave 
much doubt about the need to adequately finance higher education from the 
public purse when it presents a long list of the social and economic costs of 
under-investment in higher education: 
[T]he cost of insufficient investment in tertiary education can be very 
high. These costs can include reduced ability of a country to compete 
effectively in global and regional economies; a widening of economic 
and social disparities; declines in the quality of life, in health status, and 
in life expectancy; an increase in unavoidable public expenditures on 
social welfare programs; and a deterioration of social cohesion. 
(World Bank 2002: xxiii) 
Higher education plays a crucial role in the construction of knowledge 
societies and the rationale for the state support of higher education (within 
clearly defined limits) is surprisingly strong here. But the difference between 
the Bank's major publications, including those on the role of the state, 
privatisation of public services, reforms in healthcare and pensions, and 
the future of the welfare state on the one hand, and its (somehow niche) 
publications on the education sector on the other, has to be borne in mind. 
There is a tremendous difference between the Bank's writings on the state 
and related issues and its writings on higher education. The difference has 
been evident from the Bank's first book on the education sector published 
in 1994 (Higher Education. The Lessons of Experience) to Constructing 
Knowledge Societies (2002). There is an interesting incompatibility between 
the way the Bank in general views the role of the state vis-a-vis higher 
education, and the way the relationship is viewed by its education sector. 
Consequently, such flagship publications as subsequent World Development 
Reports are not compatible in their views on the state/market relationships 
with most of the books published by its education sector. From a wider 
perspective, higher education seems to be still viewed by the World Bank 
as a unique part of the public sector which still needs substantial public 
investments. Also its package of reform policies is developed in greatest 
detail with reference to pensions (away from `pay-as-you-go' systems 
towards `multipillar' ones), less to healthcare provision, and still less to 
higher education and its funding.' 
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The state's fiscal condition and competitors to higher 
education 
How could public funding of education and education spending (as part of 
social expenditure within the welfare state undergoing restructuring) be seen 
as an investment rather than a cost, and why should it be? Paradoxically, the 
unwillingness or inability of the state to increase the level of public funding 
for higher education (or in more general terms, to use Philip G. Cerny's 
expression, the recently decreased state's potential for `collective action', 
Cerny 1995: 618) is accompanied by a clear realisation that — in the new 
global era — higher education is more important for social and economic 
development than ever before. The United Nations' report on `globalisation 
and the state' argues that countries that want to benefit from globalisation 
must invest in education, to upgrade their citizens' skills and knowledge 
United Nations 2001: 84). Higher education in most transition countries is 
still highly selective and access to it is not equitable. Martin Carnoy concludes 
that what is needed is a coherent and systemic effort by the public sector 
— which `usually means more, as well as more effective, public spending' 
Carnoy 1999: 86). There is thus an interesting tension between what most 
education sector specialists and academics dealing with higher education 
issues say about the future of higher education and what political economists, 
political scientists or sociologists say about the future of the state, as well as 
the welfare state and its services in particular, including higher education. 
State funding for higher education, as for any other part of the public sector, 
depends on the overall outlook for state finances. The difference between 
higher education funding in the EU-15 and in post-communist new EU 
countries is substantial: while in major European higher education systems 
France, Italy, Germany and the UK) total private and public expenditure 
per tertiary student in PPP in thousand euros is between 8 and 10 (and for 
Norway reaching 12, Denmark 13.6, Sweden 14 and Switzerland 19) — for 
most CEE countries it is about 3 (Poland 3.9, Latvia 3.0, Lithuania 3.1, 
Bulgaria 3.2, Romania 3.4), and reaches higher levels only for Slovakia 4.9, 
the Czech Republic 5.2 and Hungary 7.0. In short, total expenditure per 
student in most CEE countries is three times lower than in the biggest EU-
15 economies, except for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary where 
it is two times lower (see data for 2001 in EC 2005: 35). The projections 
for the future suggest that the tight fiscal environment will continue, if not 
intensify, in the coming years. Basically, the situation faced by governments, 
under current fiscal conditions, is that of a zero-sum game: gains in share 
by one programme (e.g. higher education) basically would have to come 
at the expense of other programmes such as for example social protection. 
But at the same time social expenditures increase almost everywhere in the 
EU. The total expenditure for social protection — which does not include 
education — between 1990 and 2001 has increased in all EU-15 countries 
except Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In the vast majority of 
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them, the single most expensive social service is old-age pensions; in others, 
it is health services (Pestieau 2006: 22-4). 
This lose-lose situation is very clear in most post-communist transition 
countries: there are priorities in the transformation processes, the pie to 
be distributed is small indeed and it is largely current politics — rather than 
explicitly formulated long-term government policies — that determines how 
the pie is cut. In most affluent EU democracies, the selection of top priorities is 
still not so urgent, although unavoidable in the near future. As Andrei Marga 
sadly remarked in a paper about `reforming the postcommunist university': 
`politics and law, macroeconomics and finance, civil rights and liberties, the 
church and the family, have all been objects of consideration. But universities 
— despite the vital roles they play in providing research and expertise and in 
selecting and forming the leaders of tomorrow — have not' (Marga 1997: 
159). It was no different for welfare policies in general in European transition 
countries: Bob Deacon notes that `what became immediately evident ... was 
that debates of any kind about social policy became relegated to almost last 
place in the priority of many of the new governments' (Deacon et al. 1997: 
92 . 
Higher education in CEE countries (much more than in the old EU 
countries has to compete with other forms of state spending, and the costs 
of other forms of social needs are growing steadily, although not as rapidly 
as between the Second World War and 1980 (on the `long rise of social 
spending' from a longer historical perspective, see Lindert 2004). Higher 
education has not been competing successfully with other programmes for 
state funding over the last decade in most CEE countries. It is enough to 
see the data on the generally declining public funding for higher education 
and research and development in almost all of them in the 1990s. Allocating 
priority to different programmes is a highly political issue in every country 
and it does not seem to be any different in Europe, or in CEE countries, 
for that matter. The prospects in the future for increasing public funding 
for public higher education, including public universities, are low unless 
some unexpected new shifts in global thinking about it occur; as mentioned, 
the European Commission does not propose such actions either for higher 
education or for research and development, suggesting instead, as in the 
case of the `3 per cent' goal of national GDPs devoted to R&D activities in 
EU Member countries by 2010, that private funds contribute to reaching 
this goal. One of the solutions for public universities to thrive in the new 
setting could be to follow Burton Clark and Michael Shattock's models of 
the `entrepreneurial university' in which universities increasingly rely on non-
core non-state income (for CEE countries, see Kwiek 2006d, 2006b). 
Renegotiating two social contracts, open economies, and 
the politics of austerity 
In wider terms, the current situation of higher education and the welfare 
state can be described in Europe as follows: we are facing the simultaneous 
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renegotiation of the post-war social contract concerning the welfare state 
in Europe and the accompanying renegotiation of a smaller-scale, by 
comparison, modern social pact between the university and the nation-state.9 
The renegotiation of the latter is not clear outside of the context of the 
former, as state-funded higher education formed one of the bedrocks of 
he European welfare system. Current transformations to the state under 
the pressures of globalisation (and/or demographics, or both) will not 
eventually leave the university unaffected, and consequently it is useful to 
discuss the university in the context of the current global transformations 
of the state. The institution of the university in most advanced OECD 
economies seems already to have found it legitimate and necessary to evolve 
together with radical transformations of its social setting. Universities are 
often becoming powerful economic organisations, increasingly willing to 
play regional if not global roles, opening off-shore campuses and charging 
fees from overseas students, getting engaged in entrepreneurial activities and 
restructuring their less financially successful units. They reformulate their 
missions, become more accountable to their stakeholders and often behave 
more like businesses. They do not seem to be longing for the old humanistic 
Humboldtian and Napoleonic models, closely tied into the nation-states. For 
in the new global order, against the odds, universities are striving to maintain 
their traditionally pivotal role in society. The role of universities as engines of 
economic growth, contributors to economic competitiveness and suppliers of 
ell-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven economy is being widely 
acknowledged, especially outside of the academy. But it is undoubtedly a 
radical reformulation of the traditional social roles of the modern university 
which meant training citizen subjects of the nation-state, watching over the 
spiritual life of the people, producing and inculcating national self-knowledge 
or providing the social glue necessary to keep the citizens of the 
nation-states together (on the Humboldtian model, see Kwiek 2006c). The main 
reasons for these transformations of the university include the globalisation 
pressures on the nation-state and its public services, the end of the `golden 
age' of the Keynesian welfare state as we have known it, and the emergence 
of knowledge-based societies and knowledge-driven economies (in more 
financial terms, what seems crucial is what D. Bruce Johnstone called `diverging 
trajectories' of costs of higher education and revenues available to it, which 
according to him are a function of three forces: increasing per-student costs, 
increasing participation rates, and dependence on an increasingly inadequate 
governmental revenue (Johnstone and Marcucci 2007: 1)). 
More generally, the processes affecting the university today are not any 
different from those affecting the outside world; under both external pressures 
like globalisation) and internal pressures (like changing demographics, the 
ageing of societies, maturation of welfare states, emergent post-patriarchal 
family patterns etc.), the processes in question are the individualisation 
and recommodification) of our societies and the denationalisation (and 
desocialisation) of our economies. On top of that, we are beginning to feel at 
universities the full effects of the universalisation (or massification — in most 
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transition countries) of higher education and the increasing commodification 
of research. 
Off-loading the state through increasing private income for public 
universities and keeping the competition between public and private providers 
in education is a regional variation in CEE countries of the global theme of 
privatisation in higher education. We have been witnessing the pressures of 
global forces on both national policies with respect to the welfare state and on 
national budgets accompanied by the ideas (and ideals) of the `minimalist' — 
or, more recently, `effective', `intelligent' etc. — state with smaller social duties 
than Western Europe under post-war welfare systems was familiar with. These 
pressures are even more direct in CEE where the need for welfare services 
reforms may be (economically) more urgent than in Western Europe. In the 
case of higher education, the emergence of private providers fits neatly into 
the picture (see Kwiek 2007a). Other examples include multi-pillar pension 
schemes being introduced in many countries of the region (on Poland, see 
Chlon et al. 1999; Gomulka 2000) and the (sometimes partial) privatisation 
of healthcare services (see Adeyi et al. 1997; for Poland, see Berman 1998; 
Girouard and Imai 2000; Golinowska 2002). We are witnessing more general 
attempts at a reformulation of the post-war social contract which gave rise to 
the welfare state in its various European forms. In CEE, the social contract, 
including the question of which social benefits are universally available for 
citizens ( or more often, for working citizens) and which are not, on what 
terms and conditions, needs to be substantially re-written as the social setting 
provided by communism does not exist any more. 
The economic space of the nation-state and national territorial borders no 
longer coincide (see Scharpf 2000; Ruggie 1997). Consequently, the post-
war `embedded liberalism compromise' — the social contract between the 
state, market, and labour — does not work any more as it was designed to 
work within closed national economies. At the time, however, when major 
European welfare state regimes were being constructed, it was not fully 
realised how much the success of market-correcting policies depended on the 
capacity of the territorial nation-states to control their economic boundaries. 
Under the forces of globalisation, though, this controlling capacity was lost. 
`The "golden years" of the capitalist welfare state came to an end' (Scharpf 
2000: 255). The social contract which had allowed the nation-states in 
advanced capitalist countries to be accompanied by a welfare state originated 
right after the Second World War. With the advent of globalisation, it is 
eroding, though, to different extents in different countries. 
The privatisation of the educational sector in selected CEE countries — 
especially in its more evident variant of booming new private institutions (see 
Kwiek 2007c) and its less evident variant, as in Poland, of privatisation of the 
public sector through offering fee-paying education — fits nicely into the new 
picture of smaller social responsibilities of the state, and more responsibility 
of the individual for his or her future. The individual comes first; but also 
the individual, increasingly, pays first. Economic policies are becoming 
increasingly denationalised and the state is increasingly unable, or unwilling, 
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to keep its promises from the golden age of the welfare state. And the welfare 
state has traditionally been one of the main pillars in the appeal of 
nation-state construction. 
The power of the nation-state, and the power of the loyalty of its citizens, 
has rested on a firm belief in (historically unprecedented) welfare rights. 
When the Keynesian welfare state was formed, the role of the state was to find 
a fair balance between the state and the market — which had fundamentally 
transformed post-war social relations in all the countries involved in this 
social experiment (and now we are experiencing what Ulrich Beck called in 
World Risk Society a `domino effect': `Things which used to supplement and 
reinforce one another in good times — full employment, pension savings, high 
tax revenue, leeway for government action — now tend mutatis mutandis to 
endanger one another' Beck 1999: 11). The impact of globalisation on the 
nation-state is through undermining the founding ideas behind the post-
war welfare state: through liberalisation and the opening up of economies, 
nation-states begin to lose their legitimacy provided, in vast measure, by a 
social contract valid in closed, national economies. 
In the post-war Keynesian welfare state in Europe, higher education was 
very important — as testified by the constant growth of student enrolments, 
an increasing number of higher education institutions, and the relatively 
lavish public research funding available to universities. This massification of 
higher education was in full swing in Europe, with universalisation as its aim. 
he stagnation which began in the second half of the 1970s in Europe was 
perhaps the first symptom that the welfare system in the form designed for 
one period (the post-war reconstruction of Europe) might not be working 
in a different period. The social agenda of the 1980s and 1990s changed 
radically: after the policies of the golden age of expansion, European welfare 
states have been shaped by what Paul Pierson, a Berkeley-based political 
scientist, termed the politics of austerity (Pierson 2001). 
And the social agenda in post-1989 CEE changed even more radically: 
suddenly, the region was exposed to new economic pressures, but also to new 
market-oriented opportunities which in many cases required better skills and 
higher competencies from its citizens, provided by new, vocationally-focused 
private institutions. While in Western Europe the emergence of the private 
sector in education is both marginal and often revolutionary (see the example 
of Buckingham University in the UK, with a strong Thatcherite ideological 
underpinning), in most CEE countries it might be even considered as one of the 
more realistic options available — in the situation of the chronic underfunding 
if public institutions and, in many instances, their structural inability to face 
new challenges, with the huge social need to raise the enrolment levels at 
the forefront. To give a Polish example: the number of students increased 
from 400,000 in 1990 to almost 2,000,000 in 2006, about 32 per cent of 
which are enrolled in 315 private institutions. The capacities of the public 
sector have not changed dramatically in the period: both the number of 
faculty and educational premises available have been at roughly the same 
level. New students used the avenues available to them through the process 
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of privatisation: they either entered fee-paying part-time studies in the public 
sector or fee-paying studies in the emergent private sector. Relatively liberal 
legislation regarding the private sector, accompanied by genuine interest of 
the public sector faculty in both running fee-paying weekend studies and 
creating out of scratch the private sector made possible this impressive 
transformation of Polish higher education; see Kwiek (2007a). 
Seeing higher education policies in isolation from larger welfare state 
policies would be assuming a short-sighted perspective: higher education 
is a significant (and often significantly fund-consuming) part of the public 
sector and a part of the traditional welfare state that is right now under 
severe pressures, even though they may not be as strong as pressures on the 
two main parts of the welfare state, healthcare and pensions. In still more 
theoretical than practical terms, these phenomena had their powerful impact 
on thinking about public services, including public higher education, in 
CEE. The theoretical impact was already translated into changed national 
legislation in the case of the pensions reform and health care reforms at the 
end of the 1990s. 
Conclusions 
What we increasingly see today as universities' missions seem highly influenced 
by the two decades of reformulations (both in theory and in practice) of 
the role of public sector services; in wider terms, the university, as other 
public sector institutions, is increasingly viewed in the context of economic 
competitiveness of nations, global pressures on national economies, and 
global pressures on national welfare states. For public universities, these are 
absolutely new contexts; they are new to academics as well. The consequences 
of this shift are far reaching: for just a little more than a decade, international 
and supra-national organisations and bodies have been involved in the 
production of new university missions (both the World Bank, the European 
Commission and the OECD became seriously interested in the university 
in the second half of the 1990s, except for a few reports published earlier). 
Their influence on policy thinking and policy making has been tremendous 
all over Europe: they seem to be providing major concepts in which university 
futures are currently being discussed, and the economic spaces increasingly 
seem to converge with the academic spaces in ongoing discussions (the 
subsumption of the goals of the Bologna Process, of the ideas of the `Europe 
of Knowledge' and of knowledge-based societies under the overall EU 
`Lisbon Strategy' of `more growth/more jobs' being a good example). A 
substantially more `economic' space in which public universities are currently 
discussed (at the expense of the traditional `academic' space of the discourse 
on its roles, missions, and futures) affects institutions, academics, and 
students alike. As in the case of other major public services, healthcare and 
pensions, the economic dimension of functioning of universities comes to 
the fore, especially in the transition countries. Students in massified systems 
increasingly view themselves as consumers and view academics as providers 
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of educational services; institutions increasingly want to view individual 
academics as part-time knowledge workers rather than tenured professors 
making use of academic freedom in their quest for truth, as in traditional 
university models, and academic collegiality is losing out to managerialism 
and business approaches; societies increasingly view higher education as a 
private good and are more inclined to pay from their pockets for this good 
especially in those transition countries where the private sector is large and 
the public sector is still restrictive and elitist); finally, governments view 
universities as bedrocks of knowledge-based economies. The links between 
rethinking universities and rethinking the welfare state are powerful and need 
:o be taken into account in thinking about the production and reproduction 
of the university in the last two decades. 
The welfare state in its traditional post-war European forms, and 
its services, including public higher education, seems to be undergoing 
substantial transformations in most parts of Europe, and especially in the 
European transition countries. Lines of these changes and argumentation 
in support of them (whether by the European Commission, the OECD or 
national governments) point in a similar direction, which is more financial 
self-reliance of public universities, rethinking the introduction of student 
fees in the context of equitable access to higher education, academic 
entrepreneurialism leading to more non-core non-state income etc. (even 
though the concepts used may be different in different systems). Many 
discussions in Western Europe about welfare state futures seem academic in 
he transition economies: what they shyly predict for affluent democracies 
:s in fact already happening there. There is certainly a lot of social 
experimentation with respect to welfare going on in the transition countries. 
Nowadays, as the reformulation of the welfare state in general progresses 
smoothly (and mostly in an unnoticeable manner, for example through new 
legislation) in most parts of the world, social contracts with regard to most 
areas of state benefits and state-funded services may have to be renegotiated. 
in many respects, higher education and pensions (in transition countries 
and elsewhere) seem to be an experimental area and a testing ground on 
how to reform public sector institutions in general. The end-products 
of these experimentations are still largely hard to predict. What perhaps 
counts most in this context is a historical phenomenon that universities 
are highly adaptable institutions which tend to thrive under ever-changing 
circumstances. There is a plethora of nationally-specific and culture-related 
choices to be made by both policymakers and academic institutions, and the 
effects of these choices are still largely hard to predict. 
Notes 
1 This chapter is a revised version of a lecture I gave at the seminar `Geographies 
of Knowledge, Geometries of Power: Higher Education in the 21st Century', 
Gregynog, University of Wales, 18 January 2006. I would like to express my 
gratitude for the invitation and logistical support I received from Rosemary 
Deem and Debbie Epstein, as well as for lively comments from, and interesting 
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discussions with, the seminar participants. I would also like to thank Rosemary 
Deem for her comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
2 The Finnish generous model of the welfare state provides a special case in 
which information society is able to create a financial basis for the (renewed) 
welfare state. Castells and Himanen argue that `so far, the evidence supports 
the conclusion that, in spite of the pressures of the global information economy, 
Finland continues to be a different form of an information society, which 
combines with it a generous welfare state' (Castells and Himanen 2002: 85). 
3 Esping-Andersen argues that vocational training and increased participation in 
higher education are unlikely, by themselves, to solve the problems caused by 
a fall in the demand for low-skill labour: If fighting social exclusion through 
employment remains the principal policy goal of the European social model in 
the early 21st century, the learning offensive will have to be complemented with 
strategies of raising employment opportunities for low skill workers through 
other means' (Esping-Andersen et al. 2001: 230). 
4 An interesting distinction between the `knowledge rich' and the `knowledge poor' 
was drawn in a European Commission communication on Investing Efficiently in 
Education and Training (EC 2003: 8). 
5 What is needed in the EC's view is therefore a `combination of targeted public 
investments and higher private contributions' (EC 2003: 15). 
6 Ferge finds the neoliberal tendency dominant in CEE countries. It is `practically 
ubiquitous' and `seems to be dictated by concerns allegedly related to globalization 
pressures' ( Ferge 2001: 129-30). 
The picture and recommendations are clear: `Innovative solutions that involve 
businesses, labor, households, and community groups are needed to achieve 
greater security at lower cost. This is especially important for those developing 
countries not vet locked into costly solutions' (World Bank 1997: 5). 
8 In transition countries, there was a strong influence of the Washington Consensus 
institutions — through political pressure and aid and loan conditionalities. 
Compared with Western Europe, some CEE countries in the 1990s have gone 
much further down the road of neoliberal reforms of, for example, pension systems. 
World Bank ideas were subsequently implemented in such diverse countries as 
Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Macedonia, 
Romania, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, in different variants. To date, 31 countries 
have implemented some type of personal accounts as part of their mandatory 
retirement income systems (see Kritzer 2005). For most CEE countries, the 
social security reform was not the priority in the first wave of reforms; it was only 
in the second half of the 1990s that pension reforms became unavoidable as the 
pay-as-you-go traditional systems were consuming an enormous percentage of 
GDP (Poland establishing perhaps a record in 1996 among the OECD countries 
by spending 16 per cent of its GDP on pensions, see Holzmann 2004: 3). 
9 Some arguments in this section have been adapted from Kwiek (20056). 
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